The Effects of Moral Message Framing on Political Ideology by Christiansen, Matthew
Central Washington University
ScholarWorks@CWU
All Master's Theses Master's Theses
Spring 2018
The Effects of Moral Message Framing on Political
Ideology
Matthew Christiansen
matthchristiansen@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/etd
Part of the Other Political Science Commons, and the Social Psychology Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses at ScholarWorks@CWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Master's
Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@CWU. For more information, please contact pingfu@cwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christiansen, Matthew, "The Effects of Moral Message Framing on Political Ideology" (2018). All Master's Theses. 949.
https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/etd/949
THE EFFECTS OF MORAL MESSAGE  
 
FRAMING ON POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
 
 
__________________________________ 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
 
Presented to 
 
The Graduate Faculty 
 
Central Washington University 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
Master of Science 
 
Experimental Psychology 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
by 
 
Matthew Heder Christiansen 
 
May 2018 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
 
CENTRAL WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
 
Graduate Studies 
 
 
 
 
We hereby approve the thesis of 
 
 
Matthew Heder Christiansen 
 
 
Candidate for the degree of Master of Science 
 
 
 
 
 
     APPROVED FOR THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
 
 
______________   _________________________________________ 
     Dr. Tonya Buchanan, Committee Chair 
 
 
______________   _________________________________________ 
     Dr. Michael Harrod 
 
 
______________   _________________________________________ 
     Dr. Joshua Buchanan 
 
 
______________   _________________________________________ 
     Dean of Graduate Studies 
 iii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF MORAL MESSAGE  
FRAMING ON POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
by 
Matthew Heder Christiansen 
May 2018 
 There is disagreement as to whether and to what extent the American public is becoming 
more polarized, but certain issues such as climate change have been found to be polarizing. 
However, ideologically congruent moral message framing has been shown to moderate attitudes 
towards climate change and may provide a method to reduce polarization and moderate extreme 
attitudes. The current study attempted to broaden previous findings to investigate whether moral 
message framing could result in not only shifting relevant attitudes, but political ideology as a 
whole. Operating under Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007) two 
proenvironmental messages were constructed using ideologically congruent moral language (i.e., 
individualizing, binding). Participants reported their political ideology, after which they were 
randomly assigned to read one of the two messages. Following the message, they once again 
reported their ideology as well as their proenvironmental attitudes. We predicted an initial 
ideology x message frame interaction such that (1) the binding message would have a greater 
impact in moderating ideology as people reported higher levels of conservatism, while the 
individualizing message would have no impact across the political spectrum and (2) as people 
report higher levels of conservatism, they would report more proenvironmental attitudes in the 
binding message condition and fewer proenvironmental attitudes in the individualizing 
condition, while there would be little difference in attitudes across message conditions as people 
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reported lower levels of conservatism. The results from a series of hierarchical regressions failed 
to support these hypotheses as there was no effect of message condition, finding only that 
participants reported stronger proenvironmental attitudes as they reported being more liberal. 
However, an exploratory hierarchical regression found higher levels of initial economic 
conservatism predicted greater shifts in economic ideology towards moderation. The results 
suggest that a single issue or a single message frame without the inclusion of additional stimuli 
may be insufficient to change ideology, as well as a potential unrecognized relationship between 
economic ideology and environmental attitudes. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Over the last several decades, political ideology has become a focal point of research 
within political psychology. However, the exact definition of ideology is still debated, especially 
when related to politics. This is likely because the specifics of what constitutes certain political 
ideologies are contextual and subject to change over time. Because of this, and because an 
individual's political judgments and political behaviors are driven by his or her political ideology 
(Jost, Frederico & Napier, 2009), it is important to understand what contributes to or changes an 
individual's ideology, both in the short and long term.  
 Although there is conflicting evidence as to whether the American public is becoming 
more polarized (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Iyengar, Sood & Lelkes, 2012; Levendusky, 
2009), previous research has indicated that when exposed to a political message on same-sex 
marriage, individuals are likely to polarize and report stronger attitudes towards the subject in the 
direction of their self-reported political ideology (Christiansen & Strosser, 2016). Furthermore, 
polarization in attitudes towards specific issues such as climate change has been established 
(Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). 
 Message framing, however, may be able to reduce polarization. Recent research on 
climate change attitudes indicates that framing messages regarding climate change action in a 
manner in which action is argued to benefit society as a whole (Bain, Hornsey, Bongiorno, & 
Jeffries, 2012) or in terms consistent with the morality of the individual's ideology (Feinberg & 
Willer, 2013; Wolsko, Ariceaga, & Seiden, 2016) results in people reporting more favorable 
views on climate change action. A single attitude, however, is not completely indicative of an 
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individual's political ideology. The purpose of the current study is to investigate whether moral 
message framing can shift political ideology as a whole. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Political Ideology and Morality 
 While there is still much debate and disagreement on a specific definition for ideology, it 
can broadly be defined as a "set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be 
achieved” (Erikson & Tedin, 2003, p. 64). Although the specific attitudes and beliefs of 
ideologies may change and evolve over time, political liberalism and conservatism have been the 
most common descriptors of political ideology in many western liberal countries including the 
United States for over 200 years (Everett, 2012). It is important to note that while there is a 
correlation between political ideology and political partisanship (Carpini & Keeter, 1993), 
ideology and partisanship are separate constructs. 
 Researchers in social psychology and political science have traditionally used the one-
dimensional liberal to conservative approach to political ideology, and the traditional ideology 
measurements view it through this framework (Kirton, 1978; Wilson & Patterson, 1968). 
Recently, however, a number of researchers have disputed this traditional model, arguing that 
there are different factors within ideological factions, namely social and economic (e.g., 
Crowson, 2009; Swedlow, 2008). 
 Zumbrunnen and Gangl (2007) investigated different ideological sub-factors in political 
conservatism by first administering measures of market (economic) conservatism (i.e., a belief in 
limited government involvement in the marketplace), cultural (social) conservatism (i.e., a belief 
in upholding traditional values), and limited-government conservatism (i.e., a belief in little 
action by the federal government) to a sample of 450 U.S. citizens. There was no significant 
correlation between limited government conservatism and self-reported ideology, indicating that 
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the traditional belief in a small, non-interfering government is no longer a distinctly conservative 
belief. 
 However, the authors also found that both market conservatism and cultural conservatism 
were correlated with self-identified ideology. Furthermore, there was a weak correlation between 
market conservatism and cultural conservatism, indicating that the two factors share some 
variance, but not enough to be considered the same construct. A meta-analysis of data from the 
2004 American National Election Studies (ANES) also yielded a distinction between cultural 
conservatism and economic conservatism. These findings lend further evidence to the claims that 
a bi-dimensional view is a better representation of political ideology than the traditional, one-
dimensional, conservative-liberal view. In some instances, however, such as discussions of 
"political elites", general classification, or when predicting voting behavior, it is both appropriate 
and sufficient to use the liberal-conservative continuum (Everett, 2012; Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 
2009). 
 Regardless of whether one views political ideology as a one-dimensional or multi-
dimensional construct, there is a large body of research linking it to morality. Broadly, 
conservatives take a morally-driven avoidance approach (i.e., not taking action in order to protect 
people and things, such as not enacting gun control to protect people’s rights to own and use a 
firearm) to maintain the status quo, whereas liberals are morally-driven to a prescriptive 
approach (i.e., taking action to provide for others’ well-being such as a food stamps program) to 
actively address an issue (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2014).  
 Haidt and Graham (2007) proposed the moral foundations theory, claiming that morality 
is based on at least five foundations: harm, fairness, in-group, authority, and purity. The 
foundation of harm is used to make moral judgments and decisions based on of how much 
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damage or benefit a decision may inflict. Fairness refers to the equitability of a decision. 
Individuals use the in-group foundation to make judgments based on loyalty to, and the effect 
that a decision will have on, one's in-group. The authority foundation is based on respecting an 
individual or group using social hierarchy. The foundation of purity is based on the notion that 
an item or action has a sense of inherent sanctity or cleanliness, and is most notably 
characterized by disgust when it is violated (e.g., those who consider same-sex relationships to 
be immoral may experience disgust when observing a same-sex couple display romantic 
affection). Authors of the theory suggest that liberals use the harm and fairness foundations (i.e., 
individualizing foundations) more than the others when making decisions, and conservatives are 
more likely to use the in-group, authority, and purity foundations (i.e., binding foundations). 
 To test the moral foundations theory, Graham, Haidt and Nosek, (2009) collected data 
from 2,212 adults residing in the United States. The researchers used the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT; see Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007) to assess participants' implicit political 
attitudes. Participants then rated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with moral 
judgment items based on the five foundations. Results indicated that those whose implicit 
attitude scores were more liberal were more likely to agree with moral judgments minimizing 
harm and promoting fairness, whereas those with more conservative implicit attitude scores were 
more likely to agree with moral judgments respecting the in-group, authority, and purity 
standards. 
 In a follow-up study, Graham et al. (2009) replicated the methods previously used and 
additionally asked participants the amount of money required (options included $0, $10, $100, 
$1,000, $10,000, $100,000, a million dollars, and never for any amount of money) for them to 
make a visceral moral trade-off (e.g., kick a dog in the head). Participants received instruction 
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that there would be no repercussions for whatever decision they made. The researchers found 
that liberals were more willing to make a moral trade-off for money in the foundations of in-
group, authority, and purity, and less likely to do so for the foundations of harm and fairness. 
Conservatives were more likely to make a moral trade-off for money in the foundations of harm 
and fairness, and less likely to do so for the foundations of in-group, authority, and purity. These 
results not only support the claim that ideology is tied to morality but provide evidence in 
support of moral foundations theory.  
 Based on the findings of Graham et al. (2009) and other researchers (Haidt, Graham & 
Joseph, 2009; Weber & Federico, 2013), the moral foundations theory can account for the 
morality of individuals who do not fall directly into the one-dimensional view of liberal-
conservative as well. For example, libertarians (i.e., those who are typically socially liberal and 
economically conservative) tend to score the lowest on the purity foundation (Graham et al., 
2009). This indicates moral differences based on varying degrees of social and economic 
ideology and allows for a more in-depth and sophisticated view of the relationship between 
ideology and morality.  
 Additionally, ideological attitudes that are derived from an individual's morality tend to 
be resistant to persuasion (Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005). Some studies have even found that 
opposition to morally grounded attitudes may result in individuals becoming angry (Mullen & 
Skitka, 2006) and reporting more polarized attitudes (Christiansen & Strosser, 2016).  
 However, the "party over policy" effect demonstrates that individuals are often willing to 
violate their own moral principles in support of their political party (Cohen, 2003). For example, 
Cohen (2003) assessed participants' political ideology then randomly assigned them to read a 
policy proposal that they were told was either supported by Democrats or Republicans. 
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Regardless of whether the provisions outlined in the policy were conservative or liberal, the 
participants were more likely to report that they supported the policy if their party's name was on 
it. That is, liberals were supportive of a conservative policy if they were told it was supported by 
Democrats, and vice versa. This willingness to violate one's moral principles in support of a 
political party may contribute to political polarization. 
Political Polarization 
 
 There is much evidence indicating that over the last 40 years, political party elites (i.e., 
those who hold positions of influence within a political party), have grown more polarized in 
their voting behavior (Fleisher and Bond, 2001; McCarty, Pool & Rosenthal, 2006).  However, 
there is still debate as to whether mass polarization is occurring, either along partisan or 
ideological lines (Fiorina & Abrams, 2009; Hetherington, 2009). For example, Fiorina and 
Abrams (2009) claim that most Americans are both uninformed and do not have strong political 
ideologies. Furthermore, they suggest that any polarization is merely among political activists 
and not moderates (Fiorina, Abrams & Pope, 2008). 
 Iyengar et al. (2012) conducted an analysis of ANES data, which has ranged in response 
rates from 60 to 71 percent of American voters. Participants used a thermometer scale ranging 
from 0 to 100 to assess how "warm" (positive) or "cold" (negative) they felt towards different 
groups. Researchers found that while ratings of an individual's own party have remained 
relatively consistent, ratings of the opposing party dropped an average of 15 points between 1988 
and 2008. Their data indicate that there is increasing negative affect for the opposing party. 
Although ratings of opposing political parties have decreased, there has not been a significant 
change in thermometer ratings of ideological groups (i.e., conservative, liberal) between 1988 to 
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2008, lending evidence to the claim that polarization is more closely tied to partisanship than 
ideology.  
 Although there does not appear to be a change in temperature ratings between or within 
ideological groups, another analysis of ANES data collected between 1972 and 2004 revealed a 
decreasing number of ideological moderates (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008) contrary to Fiorina 
et al.'s claims (2008). 
 Political independents are often considered to be ideologically moderate. Although there 
are those who behave like pure independents, many of those who consider themselves to be 
independent still behave in a manner consistent with those who identify with a particular party 
(Greene, 1999, 2004; Hawkins & Nosek, 2012).  
 In a study by Hawkins and Nosek (2012) which examined independents in more detail, 
participants read a randomly assigned fabricated newspaper article in which Republicans 
proposed one welfare plan and Democrats proposed another. Although both groups read the 
same articles, the policies indicated that they were supported by different political parties 
between groups. Next, participants rated their preference for each plan. Finally, the researchers 
assessed participants' implicit party attitudes. Results indicated that independents whose attitudes 
were implicitly Democratic were more likely to support the liberal plan, whereas those whose 
attitudes were implicitly Republican were more likely to support the conservative plan. Hawkins 
and Nosek (2012) repeated the study using a special education article rather than a welfare article 
and found the same pattern of results. Further replication studies yielded similar results, 
providing evidence for the claim that self-proclaimed political independents are prone to partisan 
behavior (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012). 
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 Through cross-sectional survey data, Lupu (2014) found that individuals are likely to 
recognize the growing partisan polarization, and when they do, are likely to become more 
polarized themselves. Because they are prone to behave as partisans, leaners (i.e., independents 
whose political attitudes align to some degree with a political party) may develop stronger 
affective attachments to their ideology or the party they lean with over time, accentuating in-
group/ out-group effects. These affective attachments may result in leaners displaying the 
behavior noted by Lupu (2014) and becoming more polarized along the lines of the party they 
lean with. In turn, this polarization may contribute to the decreasing number of ideological 
moderates.  
Counterattitudinal Polarization and Moral Message Framing  
 Recent research has investigated whether an ideological message could lead to immediate 
polarization in political attitudes (Christiansen & Strosser, 2016). In this study, ideology was 
measured using a 6-point Likert scale and baseline attitudes towards same-sex marriage were 
assessed using the Attitudes Towards Same-Sex Marriage scale (ATSSM: Pearl & Galupo, 
2007). Between one to two weeks later, participants were randomly assigned to read either a 
conservative or liberal message regarding same-sex marriage, or no message at all (control), after 
which they took the ATSSM again. Results indicated that regardless of the ideological slant of 
the message, participants reported more polarized attitudes towards same-sex marriage in the 
direction of their ideological leaning. These results indicate that attitude polarization may occur 
when exposed to ideological messages, triggering the backfire effect in which people reject 
evidence that is counter to their beliefs and become not only more entrenched in their own 
beliefs, but shift their attitudes further in the opposite direction of the given information (Nyhan 
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& Reifler, 2010). However, this study used a one-dimensional measure of political ideology and 
provided no method of moderating the polarization.  
 Effective strategies aimed at reducing polarization may be found in framing messages 
(i.e., shaping them in a manner that influences individuals' reactions to them) using different 
moral foundations when communicating between ideological groups. Feinberg and Willer (2013) 
assessed participants' political ideology and then randomly assigned them to read a message 
based in the moral foundations of harm, a message based in purity, or a neutral message. Each 
message was accompanied by three pictures intended to appeal to the same moral foundations. 
After reading the message, participants reported their environmental attitudes, beliefs in global 
warming, and attitudes towards proenvironmental legislation. The researchers found that while 
there was no significant difference between any attitudes reported by liberals across conditions, 
conservatives in the purity condition reported more proenvironmental attitudes, a higher belief in 
global warming, and more favorable attitudes towards proenvironmental legislation than 
conservatives in the harm and neutral conditions. Proenvironmental arguments are 
counterattitudinal for conservatives, and the shifts indicate that presenting a counterattitudinal 
issue using a moral frame consistent with an individual's ideology may result in moderation as 
opposed to polarization in attitudes. It should be noted, however, that because participants saw 
pictures and text, one cannot be certain that the findings were due to message framing alone.  
Additionally, the framing of the messages in the experimental conditions utilized only a 
single moral foundation (i.e., harm or purity). This weakness was addressed in a similar study 
conducted by Wolsko, Ariceaga, and Seiden (2016) who used both the harm and fairness 
foundation in the individualizing message, and the in-group, authority, and purity foundations in 
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the binding message. The results were consistent with those found by Feinberg and Willer 
(2013), although pictures were used alongside the messages as well.  
Summary 
 While previous research has indicated moral message framing may lead to shifts in 
political attitudes, the current study investigated whether ideology as a whole would shift after 
exposure to morally framed messages. No pictures were used to ensure any possible effects 
observed were a result of framing alone. Additionally, the messages regarded climate change 
action, as research has shown it to be a polarizing issue (Dunlap, Xiao, & McCright, 2001; 
Feinberg & Willer, 2013; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). We hypothesized an interaction between 
initial ideology and message frame on both shifts in ideology and proenvironmental attitudes. 
Specifically, we hypothesized that: (1) the binding message would have  a larger impact in 
moderating ideology (i.e., larger shifts in SECS scores) as people report higher levels of 
conservatism, while the individualizing message would have no impact across the ideological 
spectrum (see Figure 1 for hypothesized results), and (2) as people report higher levels of 
conservatism, they would report more proenvironmental attitudes when exposed to the binding 
message and lower proenvironmental attitudes when exposed to the individualizing, while there 
would be little difference in attitudes across message conditions as people reported lower levels 
of conservatism (see Figure 2 for hypothesized results).  
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Figure 1. Anticipated results for hypothesis 1. Possible shifts in SECS scores range from -100 to 
100. The range displayed is smaller than what is possible to better present moderate anticipated 
shifts.  
 
 
Figure 2. Anticipated results for hypothesis 2. Range of possible scores for proenvironmental 
attitudes range from 3 to 15. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
Participants 
 A convenience sample was recruited using the Central Washington University's SONA 
system. Data was collected from 321 participants following the suggestion of Yin and Fan 
(2001) of a sample size to predictor ratio of at least 100:1 to reduce R2 shrinkage. Because the 
purpose of the study was to investigate political polarization in the United States, only U.S. 
citizens were sampled. Responses from 19 participants who failed the manipulation check were 
excluded. Item mean substitution was used to address missing data points. However, to avoid 
artificially decreasing the variation of scores excessively, data from 59 participants who were 
missing more than 20% of items on any scale were excluded, resulting in the data from 243 (58 
male, 180 female, 5 other/ prefer not to answer; Mage = 20.31, SD = 3.94) participants being 
included in analyses.  
Materials 
 Measures of Ideology. The 12-Item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS; 
Everett, 2012) was used to assess political ideology, which consists of a 5-item economic 
subscale and a 7-item social subscale (see Appendix A). Response options are feeling 
thermometers between 0 and 100, with higher scores indicating more conservative ideology (e.g. 
a more positive view of "Traditional Marriage"). Scores are calculated by averaging responses 
within each subscale, as well as every item for an overall score. The SECS was created using a 
sample of 291 U.S. citizens (126 females) with a mean age of 37. The SECS has adequate 
reliability based on the previous literature (Everett, 2012; social α=.87 economic α=.70) and the 
current study (social α = .84, economic α = .61). Additionally, two Likert scales (i.e., economic, 
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social) ranging from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative) were used as an additional backup 
measure of ideology, which demonstrated convergent validity for both the social (r(241) = 
.63, p < .001) and economic (r(241) = .59, p < .001) subscales of the SECS. 
 Proenvironmental Attitude Measure. Participants reported proenvironmental attitudes 
(e.g., "It is important to protect the environment") on a 3-item scale developed by Feinberg and 
Willer (2013; see Appendix B). Item responses range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). The coefficient alpha for the measure is .79, indicating acceptable reliability. 
 Climate Change Message Framing. Messages (IV1) regarding climate change action 
were constructed using the relevant foundations from moral foundations theory (i.e., harm and 
fairness for the individualizing frame, authority, in-group, and purity for the binding frame; see 
Appendix C). The messages were pilot tested on a sample of 49 participants from the Central 
Washington University SONA system using a within-subjects design to minimize researcher bias 
and to assess if messages were seen as differing in ideological strength. Participants were also 
asked to self-report their political ideology on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from very liberal (1) 
to very conservative (7) and their responses were normally distributed (M = 3.86, SD = 1.46). 
Online, participants rated how strongly they perceive each message on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from very liberal (1) to very conservative (7). The order in which they read the messages 
was randomized. A dependent/repeated measures t-test was conducted to assess whether the 
messages are perceived as ideologically different from one another. There was a significant 
difference in ideological rating of the individualizing (M = 2.49, SD = 1.40) and binding (M = 
3.71, SD = 1.78) messages, t(48) = 4.05, p < .001, indicating even though neither message was 
perceived as being conservative, they were distinguishable as being ideologically different (i.e., 
the individualizing message was seen as more liberal than the binding message). However, this is 
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not surprising as a proenvironmental stance towards climate change is typically seen as a liberal 
issue. 
Procedure 
 This study was conducted online and received approval from the Human Subjects Review 
Council at Central Washington University. Participants read an online consent form before 
proceeding to participate. 
 Participants first completed the SECS, followed by the self-reported ideology Likert 
scales. They then rated their preference for 6 colors, 4 foods, and 5 methods of transportation as 
a filler task. Participants were then randomly assigned to read either the binding or 
individualizing message. After reading the message, they again took the SECS and the self-
reported ideology Likert scales, and the 3-item proenvironmental attitudes scale. Finally, 
participants reported demographic information. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Although scores were normally distributed (see Figure 3), on average, participants 
reported being slightly more conservative than the midpoint of the SECS, (). t(242) = 7.50, p < 
.001. Additionally, participants reported proenvironmental attitudes higher than the midpoint 
(i.e., 9) of the scale (α = .76). However, as participants did not take the proenvironmental 
attitudes scale prior to message exposure, their ratings may be artificially inflated or reduced. See 
Table 1 for descriptive statistics. 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Predictor and Criterion Variables 
                         Initial                        Shift   
Variablea M SD Min Max  M SD Min Max 
Ideology 57.74 16.11 13.5 100  .38 4.26 -12.23 35.42 
Social Ideology 58.90 20.50 3.14 100  .38 5.63 -21.39 48.43 
Economic 
Ideology 
56.12 14.92 20.4 100  .38 5.46 -17.0 27.8 
Proenvironmental 
Attitudes 
12.60 2.35 3 15  — — — — 
Message 
Conditionb 
1.51 .50 — —  — — — — 
aN = 243. bCoded as 1 = individualizing, 2= binding. 
 
 17 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of participants ideology based on initial SECS scores. 
Ideological Shifts 
 To test Hypothesis 1, a hierarchical regression analysis was run using shifts in ideology 
as the criterion variable (DV), and a continuous measure of initial ideology (liberal to 
conservative SECS scores) and message frame (binding vs. individualizing) as initial predictor 
variables (Figure 4). Shifts in ideology were calculated by subtracting post-manipulation SECS 
scores from pre-manipulation SECS scores, with higher scores indicating a shift towards 
liberalism. Results yielded support for the null hypotheses, R2 = .01, F(2,240) = 2.43, p =.09, 
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indicating that shifts in ideology were not predicted by initial ideology (β = .02, p = .27) or 
message condition (β = -1.00, p = .07).  
Analysis of the regression model including the interaction of ideology × message frame 
also yielded support for the null hypothesis, R2 = .01, F(3,239) = 1.77, p =.15, as shifts in 
ideology were not predicted by initial ideology (β = .05, p = .33), message condition (β = .32, p = 
.87), or their interaction (β = -.02, p = .50). Additional within subjects analyses suggest that there 
was no significant difference in pre and post manipulation SECS scores (total or each subscale) 
for participants as a whole or within each condition (ps > .05).  
 
Figure 4. Graph of results for hypothesis 1. 
 An exploratory hierarchical regression was conducted using participant scores on the 
social subscale of the SECS only, using initial ideology and message frame as predictor 
variables, R2 = .01, F(2,240) = 1.90, p = .16 (Figure 5). Shifts in social ideology were not 
predicted by initial ideology (β = .02, p = .23) or message condition (β = -1.00, p = .17). When 
including the interaction of social ideology × message frame as an additional predictor variable, 
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R2 = .01, F(3,239) = 1.61, p = .19, we again see no effect of initial ideology (β = .08, p = .17), 
message condition (β = 1.17, p = .60), or their interaction (β = -.04, p = .30) on shifts in ideology. 
 
Figure 5. Graph of results for exploratory analysis using social ideology. 
Another exploratory hierarchical regression was conducted using the economic subscale 
of the SECS only. Shifts in economic ideology (criterion variable) could be predicted using 
initial economic ideology and message condition as predictor variables, R2 = .03, F(2,240) = 
4.44, p = .01 (Figure 6). However, initial economic ideology emerged as the only unique 
predictor of shifts in ideology (β = .06, p = .01), with participants who reported higher levels of 
initial economic conservatism demonstrating a larger shift in economic conservatism towards 
moderation. Message condition was not a significant predictor in the model (β = -1.00, p =.15).  
However, when including the economic ideology × message frame interaction in the model, R2 = 
.01, F(3,239) = 2.99, p = .03, neither condition (β = -1.86, p = .50), initial ideology (β = .04, p = 
.64), nor their interaction (β = .02, p = .74) emerged as significant predictors.  
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Figure 6. Graph of results for exploratory analysis using economic ideology. 
Proenvironmental Attitudes 
 To test Hypotheses 2, another hierarchical regression analysis was run with 
proenvironmental attitudes as the criterion variable, and initial ideology and message frame as 
predictor variables, R2 = .14, F(2,240) = 19.92, p < .001 (Figure 7). However, it was found that 
only initial ideology was a significant unique predictor (β = -.05, p <.001), with higher SECS 
scores (i.e., higher levels of conservatism) predicting lower proenvironmental attitudes, with no 
effect of message condition (β = .31, p = .27) indicating that initial ideology is a significant 
predictor of proenvironmental attitudes controlling for message condition. When we include the 
interaction of ideology × message frame as an additional predictor variable, R2 = .13, F(3,239) = 
13.278, p < .001, shifts in ideology were still not predicted by message condition (β = .68, p = 
.52) nor the interaction (β = -.10, p = .72), and ideology was no longer a unique predictor (β = -
.01, p = .12). 
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Figure 7. Graph of results for hypothesis 2.  
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix of Variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Initial Ideology ―       
2. Social Ideology .95** ―      
3. Economic Ideology .78** .53** ―     
4. Proenvironmental 
Attitudes 
-.37** -.36** -.27** ―    
5. Ideology Shifts .23 .08 .04 .05 ―   
6. Social Shifts  .04 .09 -.06 .05 .85** ―  
7. Economic Shifts .09 .03 .17* .01 .65** .15* ― 
8. Message Condition -.06 -.09 .01 .09 -.12 -.10 -.09 
* p < .05, ** p < .001  
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
 This study continues the line of emerging research into the effects of moral message 
framing on shifting and moderating political attitudes, expanding the investigation to political 
ideology as a whole, as well as examining the role moral message framing has on 
proenvironmental attitudes. It was hypothesized that (1) the binding message would have a larger 
impact in moderating ideology (i.e., larger shifts in SECS scores) as people report higher levels 
of conservatism, while the individualizing would have no impact across the ideological 
spectrum. The results failed to support this hypothesis, as neither initial ideology nor message 
condition predicted a shift in ideology regardless of initial ideology. However, initial ideology 
was a unique predictor for shifts in economic ideology specifically. 
It was also hypothesized that (2) to the extent that people report higher levels of 
conservatism, they would report more proenvironmental attitudes when exposed to the binding 
message and lower proenvironmental attitudes when exposed to the individualizing message, 
while there would be little difference in attitudes across message conditions as people reported 
lower levels of conservatism. The results did not support these hypotheses as there was no effect 
of message condition, indicating that the moral framing of the message did not influence the 
proenvironmental attitudes of partcipants. However, initial ideology was a unique predictor of 
proenvironmental attitudes overall, with higher levels of conservatism predicting lower 
proenvironmental attitudes. While previous research has found evidence that moral message 
framing can shift specific attitudes (e.g., Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Wolsko et al., 2016), our 
current findings suggest that framing of a single-issue message may be insufficient to shift 
political ideology. 
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One potential explanation for the null results may be in the study design itself. 
Participants took the study in one block, and both the pre-manipulation and post-manipulation 
administration of the SECS occurred in a single sitting. While the filler task was intended to 
remove the saliency of the political information that was solicited before exposure to the 
message, it is possible that the filler task did not provide a sufficient delay and that participants 
reported similar responses to maintain consistency. While the risk of attrition would increase, it 
is possible that a two-session design may have yielded significant results. 
 It is worth noting that while ideology as a whole did not shift, economic ideology by 
itself did, although there was no effect of message condition. This suggests that mere exposure to 
a moral proenvironmental message, regardless of framing, may result in a shift in economic 
ideology toward moderation, though it is unclear why only economic ideology and not social 
ideology was affected. No control condition (i.e., the absence of a moral message) was used 
however, so an alternative explanation is that the shifts were due to a test-retest effect, 
potentially as a result of the relatively lower reliability of the SECS’s economic subscale as 
compared to the social subscale. 
 Additionally, the messages themselves may have introduced a level of error into the 
study, as both were perceived as at least somewhat liberal overall during the pilot study, and a 
lack of perception of conservatism in the binding message may have contributed to our null 
effects. Proenvironmental rhetoric is typically associated with liberalism, and it is unclear how to 
shift perception of the messages without changing the stance (in turn changing the study to 
investigate differences in pro and antienvironmental messages) or the phrasing (removing or 
changing the moral foundations used). However, there was a significant difference in how the 
messages were perceived ideologically (i.e., the individualizing message was perceived as 
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significantly more liberal than the binding message), suggesting that the moral framing used did 
result in the binding message being seen as less liberal. 
Future research may include a replication with a control condition to find evidence for or 
against a test-retest effect for economic ideology. Furthermore, if the shift was simply an effect 
of message exposure, additional studies may further investigate the relationship of environmental 
attitudes and economic political ideology, as it would appear from the current results that 
environmental attitudes as a factor may load on economic ideology. 
 It is also important to note that there was no effect of message condition on 
environmental attitudes, inconsistent with previous research by Feinberg and Willer (2013) and 
Wolsko et al. (2016). This may be due to differences in the messages used, though a more 
probable explanation would be the inclusion of additional stimuli (i.e., pictures) with the 
messages in previous studies and the lack of them in this study. It is possible that an interaction 
of message condition and an additional stimulus were responsible for differences in 
environmental attitudes, and that moral message framing alone is insufficient. To address this 
inconsistency, this study could be replicated with the inclusion of pictures to compare the effects 
of moral message framing on environmental attitudes when paired or unpaired with additional 
stimuli. 
 Overall, this study found that attitudinal shifts resulting from moral message framing do 
not extend to ideology as a whole but may trigger shifts in smaller factors that comprise 
ideology. However, additional research is needed to draw any solid conclusions. Furthermore, 
our results raise additional questions about the relationship of environmental attitudes and 
economic ideology, as well as the extent to which additional variables play a role in using 
message framing to shift attitudes towards the environment.  
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APPENDIX A 
12-Item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (Everett, 2012) 
Please indicate the extent to which you feel positive or negative towards each issue. Scores of 0 
indicate greater negativity, and scores of 100 indicate greater positivity. Scores of 50 
indicate that you feel neutral about the issue. 
 
1. Abortion (reverse scored) 
2. Limited government* 
3. Military and national security 
4. Religion 
5. Welfare benefits (reverse scored)* 
6. Gun ownership* 
7. Traditional marriage 
8. Traditional values 
9. Fiscal responsibility* 
10. Business* 
11. The family unit 
12. Patriotism 
 
Items marked with an asterisk comprise the economic subscale. Those unmarked 
comprise the social subscale. 
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APPENDIX B 
3-Item Environmental Attitudes Scale (Feinberg & Willer, 2013) 
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) 
1. It is important to protect the environment. 
2. It is important to reduce the number of green-house gases people emit 
into the environment. 
3. Compared to other political and social issues, protecting the environment ranks as 
one of the most important. 
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APPENDIX C 
Messages 
Please read the following public service announcement: 
 
Individualizing: 
 We must take action work to reduce the harm done to this country's natural environment. 
Creating a sustainable future by taking action to reduce climate change is only fair to future 
generations and reduces the suffering of countless animals. We must make the world a better 
place by preventing future harm to the environment. Help protect the natural resources so that 
everyone has fair access to them by contacting your representatives. 
 
Binding: 
 We must take action to protect the sacredness and purity of this country's natural 
environment. Creating a sustainable future by taking action to reduce climate change is our civic 
duty, and it benefits all Americans. We must make America a better place by following the 
example of our leaders to better the environment. Help to protect the natural resources of your 
fellow Americans by contacting your representatives. 
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APPENDIX D 
Demographic Information Questionnaire 
Please report the following information about yourself: 
• Are you a U.S. Citizen? 
o Yes 
o No 
o Prefer not to answer 
• Political Party Affiliation 
o Democrat 
o Republican 
o Independent 
o Other (please specify) 
o Prefer not to answer 
• How knowledgeable are you regarding politics? 
o Not at all knowledgeable 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely knowledgeable 
• How engaged are you in politics? 
o Not at all engaged  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely engaged 
• Religion 
o Open entry 
• How religious are you? 
o Not at all religious 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely religious 
• Ethnicity 
o White or Caucasian 
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o Hispanic or Latino 
o Black or African American 
o Native American 
o Asian 
o Pacific Islander 
o Other (please specify) 
o Prefer not to answer 
• Gender 
o Male 
o Female 
o Other (please specify) 
o Prefer not to answer 
• Age 
o Open entry 
 
